Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, the country’s political leadership has increasingly undermined the Armed Forces. This trend can be traced back to initiatives like the creation and arming of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) under President Olusegun Obasanjo, the amnesty granted to Niger Delta militants, and the subsequent authorization of armed private security outfits run by some ex-militants to operate as government contractors. Unfortunately, Nigeria appears not to have learned from the devastating consequences of similar strategies, such as the Sudanese crisis.
Recently, a bill proposing the establishment of a Marine Security Corps resurfaced in the National Assembly. This follows previous failed attempts to create a Merchant Navy through legislation. Meanwhile, ex-militant warlord Asari Dokubo, known for parading his ‘soldiers’ and weapons, recently called on President Bola Tinubu to engage him and his forces in combating Boko Haram terrorists in the North, boasting of swift results. Dokubo’s confidence is likely bolstered by the lucrative contract awarded to another ex-militant, Government Tompolo, despite his controversial history of bombing oil facilities and kidnapping oil workers.
Lessons from Sudan
In 2003, the Sudanese government invited the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), also known as the Janjaweed, to assist the Armed Forces of Sudan (AFS) in suppressing a rebellion in Darfur. The RSF, composed mainly of ethnic Arabs from the Rizeigat tribe, quickly rose to prominence. By 2007, Mohammed Dagalo, popularly known as Hemeti, transitioned from a cattle trader to an RSF commander. His influence expanded as he took charge of pipeline surveillance and gold mine security, while his brother became a gold dealer in the UAE.
Hemeti’s wealth and political clout grew, leading to his appointment as Deputy Head of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council after the 2019 coup. However, in April 2023, Hemeti mobilized the RSF against the Armed Forces of Sudan in a bid to seize power. This conflict plunged Sudan into chaos, resulting in widespread destruction, the displacement of millions, and an estimated 13,000 deaths by January 2024.
A Paralleling Crisis in Nigeria
To address security challenges like insurgency, banditry, and pipeline vandalism, the Nigerian government has engaged armed non-state actors such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Northeast and pipeline surveillance contractors in the Niger Delta. While these entities were intended to supplement the efforts of the Armed Forces and other security agencies, many have overstepped their mandates, projecting influence far beyond their roles.
According to security analysts, the current push to establish a Coast Guard and, potentially, a National or Republican Guard represents a dangerous escalation. Such developments could pave the way for a Nigerian equivalent of Sudan’s RSF, with far-reaching consequences for national security.
“Gleaning from the Hemeti case, it is clear that empowering non-state actors to address immediate security challenges may have short-term benefits, but converting them into established entities poses significant risks,” one expert noted. “To avoid a Hemeti-like figure emerging in Nigeria, these actors must not be empowered beyond the state’s capacity to control them.”
A senior security officer echoed these concerns, emphasizing the need to curtail the undue prominence given to ex-militants. “The contracts awarded to these groups are essentially payouts for political allies and their godfathers, not genuine security solutions. These funds could be better spent equipping state security forces and investing in infrastructure for Niger Delta communities to foster local responsibility for protecting critical assets,” he said.
Drawing parallels to Sudan, he warned, “This is how Sudan’s crisis began—rebels armed by the state eventually turned against the government. Nigeria must learn from these mistakes and course-correct before it’s too late.”
Source: Culled from voiceofmasses